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Abstract 
In recent years, tobacco has been the subject of increasingly more stringent regulatory attention. At the 
same time there has been a proliferation of bilateral and multilateral investment agreements, While the 
former compels state Parties to take action to reduce tobacco consumption, many of the latter provide a 
guarantee to foreign investors that states will not enact measures which result in a substantial reduction 
of the value of their property.  
Recent disputes illustrate that these two sets of obligations are not capable of coexistence. 
In 2012 Australia took regulatory action, enacting legislation obliging the sale of tobacco products in 
“plain” packets. Philip Morris, Japan Tobacco International and British American Tobacco took to a 
number of different fora to challenge the measures as being in violation of their rights under national 
constitutional law, world trade law, and under international investment law. 
While the domestic law claims were limited to an assessment of the measure in the context of the 
companies’ constitutional rights, and the WTO claims face a significant hurdle because of the public 
interest nature of the regulations, the claims brought as international investment arbitrations are not 
subject to these same constraints.  
The result is a conflict of obligations. States are left in a position where they must take steps to reduce 
tobacco consumption while at the same time refraining from action amounting to expropriation of an 
investment. Does one of these obligations take priority of the other? Or must they both, as the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties suggests, be performed in good faith? 
The application of various conflicts rules imported from domestic and private international law into the 
international law sphere more generally yields some answers, goes some way to resolving the conflict, 
and reconstitutes the otherwise increasingly fragmented international law. 
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I Introduction 
Tobacco’s particularly damaging effects, on both an individual level and a societal 
level, means it is a ripe target for legislative action.  Recent years have seen an 
increasingly strong surge in anti-tobacco or tobacco control regulation.  Around the 
same time the ever-increasing volumes of global trade and investment has given rise 
to a progressively denser network of bilateral investment treaties, the purpose of 
which is the protection, preservation, and downstream encouragement of further 
investment. 
Recent regulations in Australia have all but extinguished the ability of tobacco 
companies to represent and market their brands effectively. As a result, they have 
taken action – though national courts, through the World Trade Organisation, and 
through investment arbitration using the investor state dispute mechanism available 
under several bilateral investment treaties to which Australia is a party.  In this latter 
forum, the essence of their claim (at least in party) is that the measures are a taking of 
their property – an expropriation - and failure to pay compensation is a violation 
Australia’s obligations in respect of the investments.  
This paper will assess the measures in the context of international investment law, 
with a particular focus on the investment arbitration proceedings recently launched 
by one of the world’s largest tobacco manufacturers, Philip Morris, and against the 
background of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.  
To this end, the paper will advance in six substantive parts. Part II will provide some 
context to the measures and to the complaints, assessing the historical and social 
background. Part III will briefly examine the various fora available for claims relating 
to tobacco plain packaging, and examine why investment arbitration is of particular 
significance. 
Part IV begins a substantive assessment of the claims, looking first at the protection 
against expropriation provided under the BIT and assessing the plain packaging 
measures against the various tests for expropriation.  The section concludes that the 
measures amount to expropriation and on that basis are compensable.  
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Shifting to a more policy-based discussion, Part V examines the congruence of the 
obligations owed under BITs and under a recent global public health innovation, the 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.  The section concludes that there are 
conflicting obligations under the treaties, and examines tools for resolving this 
conflict. 
II Historical and Social Background 
Long the subject of regulation, tobacco is an unusual consumer good. It is perhaps the 
only readily available product that, when used as intended, contributes to the ill 
health and, in many cases death, of the consumer.
1
 It is one of the leading causes of 
preventable death and disease in much of the developed world, branded a “public 
health problem of epic proportions” and one of the “major public disasters of the past 
century”, tobacco has long been the subject of regulation.
2
 As early as 1604 King 
James VI and I described smoking as:
3
 
a custome loathsome to the eye,  hateful to the nose, harmeful to the 
brain, dangerous to the lungs, and in the black stinking fume thereof, 
nearest resembling the horrible Stigian smoke of the pit that is 
bottomless 
and authorising the 1
st
 Earl of Dorset to levy an excise tax and tariff on any tobacco 
imported.
4
 
Though it has been in vogue at a number of points in history, recent years have seen 
governments in a number of nations take an increasingly strong stance in their efforts 
to reduce tobacco consumption, and the downstream heath effects. Most recently, 
Australia has implemented so-called “plain packaging” regulations. 
A What is ‘Plain Packaging’? 
                                                
1
  World Health Organisation WHO Report on the Global Tobacco Epidemic (World Health 
Organisation, 2008)  
2  World Health Organisation History of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
(World Health Organisation, 2009)  
3
  James I A Counterblaste to Tobacco (R Barker, London, 1604) 
4
  at 1. 
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The Tobacco Plain Packaging Act requires that as of 1 December 2012 all tobacco 
products be sold packaging that both externally and internally is drab dark brown in 
colour,
5
 free from logos or stylized brand and variant indicia.
6
 Packaging must have a 
matte finish, and must not have any decorative ridges, embossing, texture, or other 
embellishments on either the internal or the external surfaces.  Cartons must be rigid 
and made only from cardboard, rectangular when closed, and with surfaces that meet 
at 90-degree angles. Packets must open with a flip-top lid hinged only at the back, 
and must comply with regulations prescribing dimensions.  Packets must not include 
features designed to change the packaging in any way after retail sale (for example 
heat-activated ink, or surfaces that may be scratched off to reveal and image). 
Australia is the first government to enact plain packaging legislation, though the 
proposal is by no means new.  The New Zealand government first proposed the 
measure in 1989, but made no serious efforts toward its adoption.
7
  
Canada was the first state to actually take steps toward implementation,
8
 though the 
experience was far from positive. 
The tobacco industry had just come out of a lengthy campaign to reduce Canada’s 
high tobacco taxes.  In an effort to offset the accelerated uptake due to lower prices, 
the Canadian legislature began developing plain packaging regulations.  
Wary of debating plain packaging regulation in the context of public health, the 
tobacco industry, led by R J Reynolds (a subsidiary of British American Tobacco) 
shifted the goalposts: the turned to international trade and investment law and framed 
plain packaging as is issue of law distinct from any public health considerations.
9
  
                                                
5  The colour is perhaps better described as “olive”, but the name was changed following 
resistance from the Australian Olive Association. 
6
  Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth) [Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth)], ss  18- 
25. 
7
  University of California, San Francisco “Generic Packaging Meeting 22/9/93: Reference 
Documents” (14 November 2006) Legacy Tobacco Documents Library 
<http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu> 
8
  R Cunningham and K Kyle “The Case for Plain Packaging” (1995) 4 Tobacco Control 80. 
9
  See R J Reynolds Tobacco Company “Submission to House of Commons Standing 
Committee on Health Re: Plain Packaging of Tobacco Products 2" 18 (1994). 
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Ultimately the Supreme Court of Canada found the Tobacco Products Control Act 
1995 invalid, and so put an end to the plain packaging debate.
10
  The lingering threat 
of claims under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (especially 
given the agreement was very new and largely unchartered at the time) and the 
substantial compensation that could result is thought to have dissuaded any 
government considering further legislative action.
11
 
Since the mid 1990s, momentum has built.  Recent governmental action has come 
under attack by the tobacco industry.  Uruguay has taken legislative action to extend 
the surface area of tobacco packaging that must be covered with warning labels,
12
 and 
Australia has implemented plain packaging measures. 
Though restrictions on the sale and marketing of tobacco are by no means new, at 
least as far as some countries are concerned this latest wave of measures represents 
the destruction of the last bastion of tobacco advertising in marketing.  Over the last 
three decades, governments have gradually eroded the ability to advertise on 
television, in magazines, and even at point of sale.  New Zealand first introduced 
legislation to prohibit advertising in broadcast media in 1962.
13
  The United Kingdom 
followed in 1965,
14
 the United States in 1971,
15
 and Australia between 1973 and 
1976
16
. 
The tobacco industry has challenged the measures taken by both Australia and 
Uruguay.  However, unlike the Canadian experience 20 years before, the 
governments concerned are actively fighting the claims (and, at least in Australia, 
                                                
10
  RJR-Macdonald Inc and Imperial Tobacco Ltd v The Attorney General of Canada [1995] 3 
SCR 199, 204. 
11
  Matthew Porterfield and Christopher Byrnes “Philip Morris v Uruguay: Will investor-State 
arbitration send restrictions on tobacco marketing up in smoke?” (12 July 2011) Investment 
Treaty News < www.iisd.org>. 
12  For general information on the various measures taken by Uruguay, see Tobacco Epidemic 
Research Centre International Tobacco Control Policy Evaluation Project: ITC Uruguay 
National Report (Tobacco Epidemic Research Centre, August 2012). 
13
  Trish Fraser "Phasing out point-of-sale tobacco advertising in New Zealand" (1998) 7 
Tobacco Control 82; now regulated by the Smoke-Free Environments Act 1990 and the 
Smoke-free Environments Regulations 2007. 
14
  Television Act 1964. 
15
  Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act 15 USC § 1335. 
16
  Broadcast and Television Amendment Act 1976 (Cth), s 100. 
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have had partial success in this regard).
17
  The tobacco industry, and countries with 
significant interests in tobacco production have launched proceedings in every 
possible forum: through national courts, through the World Trade Organisation, and 
though investment arbitration.  
III The Question of the Forum 
Though the focus of this paper is on the treatment of plain packaging in investment 
arbitration, it would not be complete without at least a survey of the forums in which 
the claims have been made.  This assessment is by no means comprehensive; but it 
serves to illustrate the particular characteristics of each forum and why the claims 
brought as investment arbitration proceedings are of particular significance. 
A National Courts 
The latest round of regulations gave rise to a challenge in Australia’s national courts, 
the resultant case being JT International Limited v Commonwealth of Australia.
18
 In 
the case, the High Court of Australia considered the Australian plain packaging 
legislation, and reviewed its constitutional compatibility. 
The Court was of the opinion that, contrary to the tobacco companies’ claims, the 
legislation was entirely within the legislative competence of Parliament. Plain 
packaging proponents celebrated the case as being a clear indication that the 
legislation did not have the effect of ‘taking’ property (and thus the claims raised by 
the tobacco industry in the context of investment arbitration were equally futile).
19
 
However, the assessment of the claim in a national constitutional context is one 
significant factor that distinguishes the JTI case from the investment disputes.  
Though the mechanics of the investment dispute (or at least one element of it) will be 
discussed in greater detail in Part IV, infra, a high-level summary at this point will 
illustrate the difference. 
                                                
17
  See JT International SA v Commonwealth of Australia; British American Tobacco 
Australasia Limited & Ors v Commonwealth of Australia [2012] HCA 43 [JTI v Australia], 
discussed in more detail below. 
18
  JTI v Australia. 
19
  See, for example John Lowe, Alistair Woodward and Jeanne Daly "The plain facts about 
tobacco's future" (2012) 36(5) Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health  
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The Australian constitution grants limited legislative powers to the Australian 
Parliament.  Most relevantly:
20
 
The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make 
laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth 
with respect to: 
(xxxi) the acquisition of property on just terms from any State or 
person for any purpose in respect of which the Parliament has power to 
make laws 
The tobacco companies alleged that, among other things, the Tobacco Plain 
Packaging Act 2012 had the effect of taking intellectual property on terms other than 
those that were just (that is, against compensation).   
The High Court disagreed; opining that in order for there to be an “acquisition” for 
the purposes of s 51, there had not only to be a reduction in the property of one 
person, but also a corresponding increase in the property of the Commonwealth of 
Australia.
21
  Because the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act had the effect of limiting the 
ability of the tobacco companies to use their intellectual property, but did not result in 
the transfer of that property to the State, there could be no acquisition (even if there 
was a ‘taking’). 
This position differs from that in the investment arbitration context.  Under the Hong 
Kong-Australia BIT, in order for expropriation to occur there need only be a decrease 
in the property of a private party as a result of State action.
 22
  The absence of an 
increase in the property of the relevant government is not therefore determinative (as 
it is under Australian constitutional law).  Part IV will examine this point in greater 
detail. 
                                                
20
  Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp), s 51 [emphasis added]. 
21  JTI v Australia, above n 17, at 42. 
22
  Agreement Between the Goverment of Hong Kong and the Government of Australia for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments, 1748 UNTS 385  (signed 15 September 1993, 
entered into force 15 October1993) [Hong Kong-Australia BIT]. 
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Far from being the roadblock that it has been held out by plain packaging proponents 
to be, the result of the JTI case merely serves to illustrate the existence of the national 
court system as one forum for the resolution disputes of this nature. 
In addition to national courts, a number of interested countries have also lodged 
disputes in the World Trade Organisation. 
B WTO 
Principally the WTO exists to facilitate the liberalisation of trade between nations.  
Originally formed in the inter-war years, the WTO displaced the GATT in 1995.
23
  
As a forum, the WTO’s dispute settlement body exists to resolve disputes between 
states, rather than between private entities and the state.  Though it is states that bring 
claims, that is not to say that private entities have no role to play: in many situations 
cases only come before the WTO as a result of private lobbying of the responsible 
government.  
Thus far, five countries in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) have challenged the 
measures: Ukraine,
24
 Honduras,
25
 the Dominican Republic,
26
 Cuba,
27
 and most 
recently Indonesia.
28
  At the time of writing, the Dominican Republic, Cuba and 
                                                
23
  Though note that the GATT 1947 still remains in force under the World Trade Organisation 
framework, subject to the modifications of the GATT 1994. 
24  Australia - Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging 
Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging: Request for the establishment 
of a Panel by Ukraine WT/DS434/11 (17 August 2012). 
25
  Australia - Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other 
Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging: Request for 
the establishment of a Panel by Honduras WT/DS435/16 (17 October 2012). 
26  Australia - Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other 
Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging: Request for 
the establishment of a Panel by Dominican Republic WT/DS441/15 (9 November 2012). 
27
  Australia - Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other 
Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging: Request for 
Consultations by Cuba WT/DS458/1 (7 May 2013). 
28
  Australia – Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and other 
Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging: Request for 
Consultations WT/DS467 (20 September 2013). 
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Indonesia remain in consultations and the proceedings involving Ukraine and 
Honduras have had panels established but not composed.
29
 
Though subtly different the various WTO claims all run along the same broad lines.  
The complainants have alleged violations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (the GATT),
30
 the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (the TBT 
Agreement),
31
 and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property.
32
 
1 The GATT 
The complainant states maintain that the measures violate the national treatment 
oblations imposed by Article III:4 as the plain packaging measure mean that foreign 
trademark right holders are impaired in terms of their competitive opportunities vis-à-
vis domestic rightholders and producers. Similar arguments have been raised under 
Article 3.1 of TRIPS, and Article 2.1 of the TBT. 
2 TRIPS 
The impaired states argue that the measure are in violation of TRIPS as they 
discriminate against tobacco-related trademarks, fail to give effect to the trademark 
holder’s legitimate rights with respect to the trademark (essentially arguing that the 
trademark confers positive ‘use’ rights). 
Additionally, the states contend that the legislation forces companies to refrain from 
employing the trademarks in the manner in which they were intended, the effect of 
which is detrimental to their capability to distinguish tobacco products from one 
another. 
                                                
29
  World Trade Organisation “Dispute Settlement – Current Status of Disputes” (28 September 
2013 World Trade Organisation) <www.wto.org>.  
30
  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1867 UNTS 187 (opened for signature 15 April 
1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) [GATT]. 
31  Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 1868 UNTS 120 (adopted 15 April 1992, entered 
into force 1 January 1995)[TBT]. 
32
  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 1869 UNTS 299 
(adopted 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) [TRIPS]. 
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3 The TBT 
The states maintain that the measures are contrary to Article 2.2 of the TBT because 
the technical regulations imposed by the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act create 
unnecessary obstacles to trade, and are more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfil a 
legitimate objective taking into account the risks that non-fulfilment would create 
As will be shown, there are serious limitations on the usefulness of the WTO for the 
resolution of plain packaging disputes (at least from the tobacco companies’ 
perspectives) However, a number of features mean that the proceedings are 
particularly significant. 
The most significant feature is the ability of other countries to effectively insert 
themselves into the dispute through requests to join consultations. Thus far, Canada, 
El Salvador, the European Union, Guatemala, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, the 
Philippines, South Africa, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe have each had their request to 
join one or more of the consultations approved by the dispute settlement body.
 33
 
Many of these nations (notably New Zealand and the European Union) have joined 
the proceedings because they intend to enact regulations similar to those in Australia 
and thus have a particular interest in the outcome of the disputes. 
The WTO is not the perfect forum, however. The greatest limiting factor in resolving 
this particular kind of dispute is the significant carve-out for measures taken in 
pursuit of the enhancement of public heath. Article XX of the GATT provides that:
34
 
[s]ubject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or 
a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement 
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any 
contracting party of measures: 
                                                
33
  World Trade Organisation "Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS434" (18 December 2012 ) World 
Trade Organisation <www.wto.org>; World Trade Organisation "Dispute Settlement: Dispute 
DS435" (20 November 2012) World Trade Organisation <www.wto.org>; World Trade 
Organisation "Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS441" (18 December 2012) World Trade 
Organisation <www.wto.org>. 
34
  GATT, Article XX. 
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(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health 
Though historically the Dispute Settlement Body has been reluctant to permit 
measures that have a trade-limiting effect by applying one of the exceptions, usually 
positing alternatives that are (at least in its opinion) less trade restrictive,
35
 the instant 
dispute appears to be ripe for such permission. 
A further limitation, at least from the tobacco companies’ perspective, is the range of 
remedies available. The Dispute Settlement Understanding employs what is 
essentially a compliance-compensation-retaliation regime.
36
  
Where a measure places a state in breach of its obligations under a WTO agreement, 
the preferred remedy (consistent with the aims of the WTO) is compliance. This is 
unlikely to ever eventuate (at least in this context, where the justification is public 
health). As a second step, the disputing parties are encouraged to explore mutually 
acceptable compensation. The acceptability of the compensation will, however, be a 
function of the harm that may result from the third step (retaliation). Should 
compensation negotiations fail the aggrieved state can seek authorisation from the 
Dispute Settlement Body to impose retaliatory action. This action is capped at the 
quantum of the harm that the aggrieved nation has suffered.  
Honduras, Ukraine and Cuba are all parties to the Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control. The convention is in force in in the former two, and all three 
supported the adoption of the guidelines that suggest plain packaging as a smoking 
                                                
35  Since the establishment of the WTO, Article XX of the GATT has been invoked by a 
respondent in 34 proceedings, and the equivalent Article XIV in the GATS has been invoked 
once. The general exceptions were deemed to be relevant in 26 of those proceedings, they 
succeeded in only one – in European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Products Containing Asbestos WT/DS135/AB/R (5 April 2001). For a general discussion of 
the exceptions, see Simon Lester and others World Trade Law: Text, Materials and 
Commentary (HART publishing, Portland, 2008) at 385. 
36
  Kyle Bagwell "Remedies in the World Trade Organisation: An Economic Perspective" in 
Merit Janow, Victoria Donaldson and Alan Yanovich (eds) The WTO: Governance, Dispute 
Settlement & Developing Countries (Juris Publishing, Inc, Huntington, New York, 2008) 
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reduction mechanism.  On the same day Ukraine made its request for consultations, 
its President signed into force a law banning tobacco advertising.
37
 
Furthermore, the existing trade relationships between Australia and all calming 
nations (with the exception of Indonesia) are of minimal value in terms of Australia’s 
total trade.
 38
 Unlike Turkey, Zimbabwe (all of which export raw tobacco leaves to 
Australia), most of the claiming nations have little interest in exporting tobacco to 
Australia. Indonesia does, however, export raw tobacco leaves to Australia and so has 
some vested interest in the case.  In the case of Ukraine, there has been no trade in 
tobacco with Australia since 2005, and the head of the Tobacco Control Unit in the 
Ukrainian Ministry of Health has said, “there is no economic interest whatsoever… 
no one in Ukraine will suffer from Australian Plain Packaging”.
39
 
It would be surprising, therefore, if Australia were even remotely concerned about the 
retaliatory action that it may face because of the measures.  For this reason it is 
highly unlikely that consultations and subsequent compensation negotiations will be 
successful from the claimant nations’ perspectives – the result being that those 
nations raise tariffs on the selected Australian imports which, given the relative trade 
volumes, will have a significant positive impact on domestic prices in the claiming 
states but a negligible impact in Australia. 
Furthermore, the nations have not been particularly forthcoming with reasons for the 
claims; perhaps because to do so would ultimately result in a discussion centred on 
the conflicting position they have put themselves in.  What seems likely, however, is 
that it is principally a push by the tobacco companies in an effort to get some form of 
precedent that, if favourable, can be taken to a less innocuous forum; or alternatively 
                                                
37
  Tobacco World News "Yanukovych signs law to ban tobacco advertising" (14 March 2012)  
<www.tobaccocampaign.com/>. 
38  The complainant countries are worth relatively little to Australia in terms of Australia’s total 
trade volumes. Trade with Ukraine amounted to AUD 117m for the 2012 year, the Dominican 
Republic amounted to AUD 34.5m, Honduras amounted to AUD 22.3m and Cuba amounted 
to AUD 15m. In terms of their ranking as trade partners they were 75
th
, 101
st
, 115
th
, 134
th
 
respectively. By comparison Honduras considers Australia its 22
nd
 largest trading partner.  
Australian Government: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade "Country, economy and 
regional information - Australia Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade" (June 
2013)  Australian Government <www.dfat.gov.au/>. 
39
  Amy Corderoy "Mystery over Ukraine tobacco law challenge" (27 March 2012)  
<www.smh.com.au/>. 
PLAIN PACKAGING, INVESTMENT TREATIES, AND THE 
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL 
 
12
to discourage other nations from taking similar action for fear that deep-pocketed 
tobacco companies will haul them before international tribunals. 
The remaining forum, and the one with which the remainder of this paper is 
principally concerned is investment arbitration.  
C International Investment Arbitration 
Like many nations, Australia is party to bilateral and multilateral investment treaties, 
and free or preferential trade agreements with investment chapters.
40
  These exist to 
encourage investment in a state. In pursuit of this goal, the contracting states make 
certain guarantees to one other in respect of the protection and treatment of 
investments originating in the other’s state. 
Australia and Hong Kong are party to one such BIT, the Agreement between the 
Government of Hong Kong and the Government of Australia for the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments (the Hong Kong-Australia BIT).
41
 Under this BIT, the 
governments agree not to expropriate investments (except in certain limited 
circumstances) and to treat investments in a manner that is fair and equitable (among 
other things).
42
 Crucially, the Hong Kong-Australia BIT contains an ‘investor-state 
dispute mechanism’ (ISDM) which allows investors to claim directly against a state 
by submitting disputes that cannot be amicably resolved to arbitration under the 
UNCITRAL rules.
43
 The result of the ISDM is that investors are not forced to resort 
to use of diplomatic protection mechanism in order to seek redress. 
Following the passage of Australia’s tobacco plain packaging legislation, Philip 
Morris Asia Limited, a company based in Hong Kong and which holds the various 
Philip Morris trademarks (including Marlboro),
44
 commenced proceedings against 
                                                
40
  Note that throughout this paper the relevant agreements will be referred to as bilateral 
investment treaties, or BITs, but the comments are of more general application and will apply 
equally to multilateral treaties, or those trade agreements that include an investment regime.  
41
  Hong Kong-Australia BIT, above n 22. 
42  at Articles 2 and 6. 
43
  Hong Kong-Australia BIT, above n 22, Article 10. 
44
  Philip Morris International “Philip Morris International Hong Kong” (2012) Philip Morris 
International <www.pmi.com>. 
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the Government of Australia
45
 The statement of claim alleges violations of both the 
prohibition on expropriation, and of the fair and equitable treatment standard.
46
  
Philip Morris International, Philip Morris Asia’s parent company, has also 
commenced action against Uruguay citing concerns in relation to its packaging 
restrictions.
47
 In 2005 Uruguay mandated that 80 per cent of external packaging of 
cigarettes must bear warning labels, an increase from the previous requirement of 50 
per cent. Though tobacco companies are still permitted to use their branding and can 
utilise other design elements (such as texture or bevelling), the measures are similar 
in effect to plain packaging insofar as the space available to place branding is so 
minimal (once a barcode and various manufacturer information is included along 
with the warnings) that the packages become virtually indistinguishable. In addition, 
cigarette advertising and sponsorship was banned, and significant restrictions placed 
on where smoking is permitted.
48
 
Like the Australian dispute, the Uruguayan dispute is based on a BIT between 
Uruguay and Switzerland that protects investments from expropriation in terms 
virtually identical to the Hong Kong-Australia BIT.
49
 In July 2013 the panel 
determined that it has jurisdiction to decide on the substantive claim.
50
 
What makes investment arbitration perhaps the most important forum for disputes of 
this nature is the significant impact that the outcome (and subsequent action or 
inaction) may have. Bilateral investment treaties provide a means by which a state 
can encourage investment – by providing guarantees to potential investors regarding 
the security of their investments, states provide much needed certainty. If regulatory 
                                                
45
  Philip Morris Asia Limited v The Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No 
2012-12 [PMA v Australia]; Notice of Claim, Notice of Arbitration 
46  PMA v Australia, Notice of Claim 
47  Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental 
Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7 (formerly FTR Holding SA, Philip Morris 
Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay) [PMI v Uruguay], 
Statement of Claim. 
48
  Smoking is now only permitted in private homes and in open public spaces 
49  Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay on the 
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments 1976 UNTS 389 (signed 7 October 
1988, entered into force 22 April 1991) [Switzerland-Uruguay BIT], Articles 3 and 4. 
50
  PMI v Uruguay (Decision on Jurisdiction), 2 July 2013. 
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action taken by the state is found to be non-expropriatory then there may be a 
“chilling” effect, and the benefit provided by the BIT is unwound. 
In addition, the nature of investment arbitration means that decisions that ultimately 
impact the public purse are made outside of the hands of the state. In the instant case, 
it is difficult if not impossible to quantify the tobacco companies’ loss. As the 
investment has no end date, applying the orthodox method of discounted future cash 
flow results in a theoretically infinite loss.
51
 The potential damage to state funds, 
then, is enormous. 
This paper will now move to assess the various aspects of the investment arbitration 
claims, beginning first with expropriation. 
IV Expropriation 
The most crucial argument launched by the tobacco companies relates to the 
expropriatory nature of plain packaging regulations. It is said that plain packaging is 
expropriatory as the effect of the measure is to reduce (or entirely remove) the value 
of the investment, specifically the intellectual property that comprises the 
trademarked brand names, and associated designs.
52
  
This part will address the issue of expropriation. Section A will outline the argument 
advanced by Philip Morris, Section B will examine the impinged right, assessing the 
scope of that right. Section C will assess the plain packaging measures in the context 
of the protection offered by the BIT (and BITs more generally). Finally, Section D 
will look at a potential “public health exception” that has been developed through 
some arbitral awards. The part will conclude that the measure is likely expropriatory, 
and that there is no public health exception (and that if there is, its application in this 
context is illogical). 
A The Philip Morris Argument 
Philip Morris operates in Australia though a number of subsidiaries. Philip Morris 
Asia (PMA) owns all of the available shares in Philip Morris (Australia) Limited, 
                                                
51
  Sergey Ripinsky and Kevin Williams Damages in International Investement Law (British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law, London, 2008) at 63, 188. 
52
  PMA v Australia, Notice of Arbitration at [7.3] – [7.5]. 
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which in turn owns all of the available shares in Philip Morris Limited (PML). Philip 
Morris Asia and Philip Morris Australia though Philip Morris Limited import, market 
and distribute cigarettes (among other tobacco products) for sale in the Australian 
market.
53
 In addition, Philip Morris Limited operates a manufacturing plant in 
Moorabbin, Victoria, which produces cigarettes and other tobacco products for 
domestic sale and for export to New Zealand.
54
 
Philip Morris, in its notice of arbitration, argues that Australia’s plan packaging 
legislation is plainly equivalent to deprivation of PMA’s investments.
55
 The 
legislation, it is said, deprives PMA of the value of its shares in Philip Morris 
Australia, and consequently Philip Morris Limited, which is dependent upon the 
ability to use the intellectual property. Further, the loss of the commercial use of the 
intellectual property interferes with PML’s ability to denote the origin of its products, 
to differentiate between it and its competitor’s products, and to distinguish it from 
illicit products.
56
 The result of the plain packaging legislation is the destruction of the 
commercial value of the intellectual property and goodwill.  
Because the plain packaging regulation amounts to expropriation, it must be 
implemented against compensation.
57
 The absence of this compensation, and the lack 
of a proven public purpose related to the internal needs of Australia mean that the 
expropriation is unlawful. 
Before this claim can be assessed on its merits, we must first gain an understanding 
of the protection offered by the bilateral investment treaty. 
B Expropriation 
The first factor to consider is who gains the protection of a treaty of this nature. A 
comprehensive assessment of whether Philip Morris is an “investor” for the purposes 
of the Hong Kong-Australia BIT is outside the scope of this paper. However, for 
completeness the requirements will be assessed in brief. 
                                                
53
  PMA v Australia, Notice of Arbitration at [5]. 
54
  Philip Morris International “Philip Morris International Australia” (2013) Philip Morris 
International  <www.pmi.com>. 
55
  PMA v Australia, Notice of Arbitration at [7.3]. 
56
  at [7.3(b)]. 
57
  at [7.4] – [7.5]. 
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1 “Investor” 
“Investor” is a defined term under the Hong Kong-Australia BIT. Article 1(f) 
provides that:
58
 
“investors” means: 
(i) in respect of Hong Kong: 
(A) physical persons who have the right of abode in 
its area; and 
(B) companies as defined in paragraph (1)(b)(i) of 
this Article; and 
(ii) in respect of Australia: 
(A) physical person possessing Australian citizenship 
or who are permanently residing in Australia in 
accordance with its laws; and 
(B) companies as defined in paragraph (1)(b)(ii) of 
this Article. 
Article 1(b) provides:
59
 
“companies” means: 
(i) in respect of Hong Kong : corporations, partnerships, 
associations, trusts or other legally recognised entities 
incorporated or constituted or otherwise duly 
organised under the law in force in its area or under 
the law of a non-Contracting Party and owned or 
controlled by entities described in this sub-paragraph 
or by a physical person who have the tight of abode in 
its area, regardless of whether or not the entities 
referred to in this sub-paragraph are organised for 
pecuniary gain, privately or otherwise owned, or 
organised with limited or unlimited liability; 
                                                
58
  Hong Kong-Australia BIT, above n 22. 
59
  at Art 1(b). 
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(ii) in respect of Australia : corporations, partnerships, 
associations, trusts or other legally recognised entities 
incorporated or constituted or otherwise duly 
organised under the law in force in its area or under 
the law of a non-Contracting Party and owned or 
controlled by entities described in this sub-paragraph 
or by a physical person who is an investor of 
Australia under its law, regardless of whether or not 
the entities referred to in this sub-paragraph are 
organised for pecuniary gain, privately or otherwise 
owned, or organised with limited or unlimited 
liability; 
Prima facie, Philip Morris is able to satisfy this definition. As Australia has noted in 
its Response to Notice of Arbitration, however, the structure of the entities within the 
Philip Morris group of companies is hardly serendipitous. Against the backdrop of a 
number of Australia’s anti-tobacco regulatory measures, PMA acquired its 
shareholding in PM Australia as late as February 2011.
60
  
What is significant about the point at which this acquisition took place is that in 2008 
the Australian Government established the National Preventative Health Taskforce.
61
 
This taskforce engaged in substantial consultation (in which PML participated
62
) and 
in 2009 recommended the Government mandate the sale of tobacco products in plain 
packaging.
63
 The Government subsequently announced, in 2010, its intention to 
implement plain packaging.
64
 
                                                
60
  PMA v Australia, Australia’s Response to the Notice of Arbitration at [4] – [5]. 
61  Preventative Health Taskforce “Terms of Reference” (6 September 2008) Preventative Health 
Taskforce <www.preventativehealth.org.au>. 
62
  Philip Morris Limited “Philip Morris Limited’s Submission to the National Preventative 
Health Taskforce Consultation: Australia: The Healthiest Country By 2020” (2 January 2009) 
at 22. 
63
  Preventative Health Taskforce “Technical Report 2: Tobacco Control in Australia: making 
smoking history” (2009) Preventative Health Taskforce <www.preventativehealth.org.au> at 
vii, 21. 
64
  Australian Government: Department of Health and Ageing "Plain Packaging of Tobacco 
Products" (31 July 2013) Australian Government  <www.health.gov.au>. 
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PMA, therefore, acquired its shareholding in the knowledge that the Government 
intended to implement plain packaging measures. In addition, members of the Philip 
Morris group had, throughout the consultation process, objected to plain packaging 
on the basis that it would put Australia in breach of its various international trade and 
investment law obligations. At no time did Australia acknowledge any merit in these 
objections, instead showing clear indication that it intended to forge ahead with the 
regulations.
65
 
This raises a preliminary question regarding jurisdiction, but also a question on the 
merits as to whether there can be a breach when an investment was made in the 
knowledge that it may at some later point be subject to adverse regulatory measures. 
More crucially, this date has the potential to impact the compensation Philip Morris 
may be entitled to should there be a positive finding on the question of expropriation. 
Article 6 of the BIT itself provides:
 66
 
…[c]ompensation shall amount to the real value of the investment 
immediately before the deprivation or before the impending 
deprivation became public knowledge whichever is the earlier. 
Rather unusually, PMA argues that the measures substantially eliminate the value of 
their investment, and acknowledge their participation in the consultation process that 
pre-dates the transfer of the investment to a Hong Kong based entity. Philip Morris 
had no investment before the point at which a policy announcement was made, and as 
Mark Davison candidly explains in his commentary on the issue “as a general rule, 
the value of nothing is nothing”.
67
 
A full assessment of this point falls outside the scope of this paper. For the purposes 
of the assessment of whether the measures are expropriatory we will take as given 
that the investor is genuine. 
                                                
65  PMA v Australia, Australia’s Response to the Notice of Arbitration at [5] – [6]. 
66
  Hong Kong-Australia BIT, above n 22, art 6 (emphasis added). 
67
  Mark Davison "Big Tobacco vs Australia: Phillip Morris scores an own goal" (20 January 
2012) Monash University <www.monash.edu.au>. 
CAMPBELL M M HERBERT 
 
19
What then falls for consideration is whether the property at issue is capable of being 
expropriated; or, to frame the question in an alternate way, whether there is an 
“investment” for the purposes of the BIT. 
2 “Investment” 
Expropriation not only affects tangible personal or real property, but also and 
increasingly a vast array of intangible assets – intellectual property, equitable 
interests and contractual rights are each capable of expropriation. Like tangible 
property, intangible property is of economic value to an investor; and in many cases 
the value will be significantly more than that investors’ tangible property. 
The case law of the PCIJ and a number of arbitral tribunals supports the inclusion of 
intangible property within the definition of property capable of expropriation.  In 
Chorzów Factory the PCIJ was asked to consider the effect of Polish measures on 
Bayerische, a German company, which had been contracted to manage a nitrate plant 
that was owned by another German company, Oberschlesische.
68
 The Court held that 
property of Oberschlesische had been expropriated, but also that:
 69
 
it is clear that the rights of the Bayerische to the exploitation of the 
factory and to the remuneration fixed by the contract for the 
management of the exploitation and for the use of its patents, licences, 
experiments etc, have been directly prejudiced by the taking over of the 
factory by Poland. 
Of course, intangible property can be expressly excluded from the protection of a 
BITs, but absent any express exclusion intangible property is likely to be included (if 
only impliedly) within the meaning of “investment” or “property”. 
In any event, most BITs are sufficiently broad in their definitions of “property” or 
“investment” to include such intangible forms of property. The Hong-Kong Australia 
BIT is no exception. Article 1(e) defines an investment as:
70
 
                                                
68  Case concerning certain German interest in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v Poland) 
(Judgment)(1926) PICJ (series A) No 7 [Chorzów Factory] 
69
  at 22. 
70
  Hong Kong-Australia BIT, above n 22, art 1(e). 
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[e]very kind of asset, owned or controlled by investors of one 
Contracting Party and admitted by the other Contracting Party subject 
to its law and investment policies applicable from time to time, and in 
particular, though not exclusive includes: 
(ii) shares in and stock, bonds and debentures of a company and any 
other form of participation in a company; 
(iv) intellectual property rights including rights with respect to 
copyright, patents, trademarks, trade names, industrial designs trade 
secrets, know-how and goodwill. 
Having regard to this provision, and setting aside the timing issues, there can be no 
doubt that the trademarks involved in the recent tobacco cases are property of a kind 
that can be the subject of expropriation.  
The question, then, is whether plain packaging regulation amounts to expropriation. 
To answer this, we move to assess the mechanics of the measures, and the elements 
to be satisfied to make out a claim of expropriation.  
3 Direct or Indirect 
Expropriation has been an issue in international law for much of recent history. 
Communist reforms and the Mexican nationalist measures of the 1920s developed 
expropriation into an issue of great significance, a status which was carried through 
to the oil concessions of the 1960s, and the Iranian nationalisations in the late 
1970s.
71
 
Gone, however, is the age of direct taking of private property by the State; today the 
primary form of expropriation is indirect, and it is indirect expropriation with which 
we are principally concerned in the instant case. There is no dispute that customary 
international law (and treaty law) extend to cover indirect expropriation. As early as 
                                                
71
  August Reinisch "Expropriation" in Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino and Christoph 
Schreuer (eds) The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2012), at 408 - 410. 
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1967 the OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property provided 
that:
72
 
No party may directly or indirectly nationalise or expropriate an 
investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a 
measure tantamount to nationalisation or expropriation of such an 
investment. 
Further, international law is well settled on the specific conditions giving rise to 
lawful expropriation – the taking must be for a public purpose, it must comply with 
principles of due process, be non discriminatory, and be compensated.
73
 It is this 
formulation that is employed in the Hong Kong-Australia BIT, Article 6 of which 
provides:
74
 
Investors of either Contracting Party shall not be deprived of their 
investments nor subjected to measures having effect equivalent to such 
deprivation in the area of the other Contracting Party except under due 
process of law, for a public purpose related to the internal needs of 
that Party, on a non-discriminatory basis, and against compensation.
 
As transparent as those conditions may appear the concept of ‘expropriation’ is 
somewhat more opaque. Add where the contention arises is in determining what 
amounts to expropriation (lawful or otherwise) in the first place. In many cases 
takings will occur, but they will not reach a threshold sufficient to enter the realm of 
expropriation;
75
 or there may be some public-interest factor that operates to legitimise 
the taking. 
                                                
72
  OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property (1968) 7 ILM 117. 
73
  OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs "’Indirect Expropriation’ and the 
‘Right to Regulate’ in International Investment Law" (September 2004) OECD 
<www.oecd.org>. 
74
  Hong Kong-Australia BIT, above n 22[emphasis added] 
75
  Pope & Talbot Inc v The Government of Canada (Interim Award) UNCITRAL, 26 June 2000 
[Pope & Talbot] at [28]. 
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The vast majority of BITs do not define expropriation, and there is no universally 
accepted or settled definition at international law.
76
 Nowhere is this more evident 
than in the area of indirect expropriation.
77
 
Beyond just lacking a definition, indirect expropriation evades clear definition. 
Variously described as “de facto” “disguised”, “constructive”, “regulatory”, 
“consequential” and  “creeping”,
78
 indirect expropriation is a nebulous concept, and 
the criteria identified as giving rise to it are as diverse as the labels for it. However, 
there are some unifying features: indirect expropriation may occur in situations where 
state action “[results] in the effective loss of management, use or control, or a 
significant depreciation of the value, of the assets of a foreign investor” but which 
otherwise falls short of an actual taking.
79
 
In Técnicas Medioambientales TECMED SA v The United Mexican States the 
tribunal took the view that expropriation would occur if “any exploitation” of an 
investment had ceased to be possible, or if the “economic value of the use, 
enjoyment, or disposition of the assets or rights affected by the administrative action 
or decision have been neutralised or destroyed”.
80
 The tribunal in LG&E took a 
similar view, but was clear that the substantial deprivation must be permanent and of 
lasting consequence.
81
 
Perhaps the greatest contributor to the definitional difficulties is the nature of the act 
itself.  Unlike direct expropriation, indirect expropriation is not usually a single act 
                                                
76
  Reinisch, above n77, at 408. 
77  L Yves Fortier and Stephen L Drymer "Indirect Expropriation in the Law of International 
Investment: Know it When I See It, or Caveat Investor" (2005) 13 Asia Pacific Law Review 
79, at 82. 
78
  Campbell McLachlan, Laurence Shore and Matthew Weiniger International Investment 
Arbitration: Substantive Principles (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 2007) at 8.128; see 
also Draft Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts in Report of the 
International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session [2001] vol 2, pt II 
YILC, Article 15. 
79
  August Reinisch "Legality of Expropriations" in August Reinisch (ed) Standards of 
Investment Protection (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 2008). 
80
  Técnicas Medioambientales TECMED SA v The United Mexican States (Award) ICSID Case 
No ARB(AF)/00/2, 29 May 2003 [Tecmed] at [116]. 
81
  LG&E Energy Corp, LG&E Capital Corp, and LG&E International Inc v The Argentine 
Republic (Decision on Liability) ICSID Case No ARB/02/1, 3 October 2006 [LG&E v 
Argentina], at [200]. 
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like a compulsory transfer of title. More often it is a process, the effect of which is 
the gradual erosion of the some fundamental right of property, the end result of which 
is an expropriation.
82
 In the case of tobacco, this could be considered the net sum of 
the various restrictions placed on the companies’ use of their trademarks. In Australia 
this consists of the inability to advertise, sponsor sports or other events under the 
tobacco brand names, or, now, display the logo on cigarette packaging (the very 
product that provides the raison d’être for the branding).
83
  
Does plain packaging, then, amount to expropriation? To answer this, we must assess 
the pain packaging measures against the ordinary framework of acts that constitute 
expropriation.  
International law recognises that “measures taken by a state can interfere with 
property to such an extent that the rights are rendered to useless they must be deemed 
to have been expropriated.”
84
 What are left after the previously legitimate uses of 
tobacco branding have been removed are pieces of intellectual property for which 
there is no use, and thus no value; and goodwill, the value of which has been all but 
extinguished. The effect of plain packaging, therefore, is to deprive the investors of 
the economic value that they would have otherwise realised from their investment, 
and to cause the loss of the normal control that could be exercised over the 
property.
85
  
In assessing whether indirect expropriation has occurred, arbitral tribunals examine 
whether the challenged measure led to a “substantial deprivation” of the investment 
(or corresponding economic benefit). The standard of deprivation was identified in 
Pope & Talbot Inc v The Government of Canada
86
 there are a number of factors that 
may signify indirect expropriation, including the continuing ability of the investor to 
control the investment; whether the investor remains capable of directing the day to 
day business; whether employees have been detained; whether the host state collects 
                                                
82
  International law recognises that ‘creeping regulation’ can amount to indirect expropriation, 
see: McLachlan, Shore and Weiniger, above n 78, at 8.128. 
83
  Tobacco Advertising Prohibition Act 1992; Tobacco Advertising Prohibition Regulations 
1993; Tobacco Advertising Prohibition Amendment Regulations 2012 (No 1). 
84  Starret Housing Corp v Iran (1983) 16 IRAN-US CRT Rep 112, at 154. 
85
  Tippets, Abbett, McCarth, Stratton v TAMS-AFFA Consulting Engineers of Iran (1984) 6 
IRAN-US CRT Rep 219. 
86
  Pope & Talbot, above n 75, at [101]. 
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revenues from the company; whether the host state has take over supervision of the 
investment; whether the host state interferes in the activities of managers or 
shareholders;
87
 and whether the investor is still able to “use, enjoy, or dispose of the 
property”.
88
 In keeping with this discussion, attempts to define indirect expropriation 
have focussed on the (un)reasonableness of the interference  with the property.  
4 Partial Nature of the Expropriation 
Some commentators have argued that this expropriation is only partial: the effect of 
plain packaging is to restrict the use of trademarks and brand names attached to 
tobacco products. The legislation does not prohibit the sale of tobacco, and nor does 
it affect the ownership of any property. The right to prevent others from using a 
certain design or trade name remains, and so too does the title to the property itself 
(and thus so too does at least part of the value of the property). If this is true, a 
question therefore arises as to whether the partial nature of the taking precludes a 
finding of expropriation. Although never assessed in this specific context, the issue of 
so-called “partial expropriation” has come before arbitral tribunals before; the 
outcomes have been varied. 
(a) Partial expropriation does not amount to expropriation 
Some tribunals have explicitly denied that partial expropriation is expropriation. In 
Marvin Feldman v Mexico the investor exported various products including cigarettes 
and alcohol.
89
 The challenged measure was found to deprive the investor of the 
possibility of exporting tobacco products. The investor remained in control of its 
business and remained able to export other products.
90
 
In Telenor Mobile Communications AS v The Republic of Hungary the tribunal 
applied a similar test, that being: “whether, viewed as a whole, the investment has 
                                                
87
  at [101]. 
88
  at [102]. 
89
  Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v. United Mexican States (Final Award) ICSID Case No 
ARB(AF)/99/1, 16 December 2002. 
90
  at [52], [111], [142], [209]; Andrew Mitchell and Sebastian M Wurzberger "Boxed in? 
Australia's Plain Tobacco Packaging Initiative and International Investment Law" (2011) 27 
Arbitration International at 11. 
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suffered a substantial erosion of value.”
91
 This test requires an investor to show either 
that the investment as a whole has suffered significantly, or, alternately, that a single 
significant piece of their investment has suffered. 
In cases of large and diversified businesses this may be difficult to satisfy. However, 
in the case of tobacco the threshold is almost certainly crossed. The whole of Philip 
Morris’ business is the manufacture, sale and distribution of cigarettes or other 
tobacco products;
92
 the question however remains open and is discussed in more 
detail below. 
Contrastingly, some tribunals have expressed mild support for the concept of partial 
expropriation.  
(b) Partial expropriation may amount to expropriation 
In SD Myers Inc v Government of Canada the tribunal was open to the idea, and was 
of the opinion that a “lasting removal” of the ability of an owner to make use of its 
rights is expropriatory, and that “in some contexts and circumstances, it would be 
appropriate to view a deprivation as amounting to an expropriation, even if it were 
partial or temporary.”
 93
 
The tribunal in Waste Management Inc v United Mexican States (No 2) in 
considering the standard set by Article 1110 of the NAFTA adopted a similar 
position (though not as expressly). It suggested that one step in its consideration 
process involved an examination of “whether (even if there was no wholesale 
expropriation of the enterprise as such) the facts establish a partial expropriation.”
94
 
If this reasoning is to be adopted, expropriation can still exist even in situations 
where the challenged measures do not undermine the entire business of the investor. 
If, for example, tobacco companies were part of a broader company or had 
                                                
91
  Telenor Mobile Commnications AS v The Republic of Hungary (Award) ICSID Case No 
ARB/04/15, 13 September 2006, at [67]. 
92
  Philip Morris International Inc "2012 Philip Morris International Inc. Annual Report " (2012) 
Philip Morris <www.investors.pmi.com>. 
93  SD Myers, Inc v Government of Canada (Partial Award) UNCITRAL (NAFTA), 13 
November [SD Myers], at [283] (emphasis added). 
94
  Waste Management, Inc v United Mexican States (No 2) (Award) ICSID Case No 
ARB(AF)/00/3 (NAFTA), 30 April 2004, at [141] (emphasis added). 
PLAIN PACKAGING, INVESTMENT TREATIES, AND THE 
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL 
 
26
substantially diversified interests (as British American Tobacco through their 
ownership of Saks Fifth Avenue, Kohl’s, Marshall Field’s (now Macy’s) and their 
stake in the Zurich Financial Services Group) then a claim of expropriation could still 
succeed.
95
 
The final view is that, irrespective of specific circumstances, company structure and 
diversification or other considerations, partial expropriation will always amount to 
expropriation. 
(c) Partial expropriation is expropriation 
In Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co SA v Arab Republic of Egypt a 
tribunal, in assessing whether there was expropriation of large portion of a 
company’s asset base, separately examined each asset (treating it as though it were an 
independent investment).
96
  The tribunal ultimately determined that a prohibition on 
the exercise of rights under certain import licences was expropriatory (but other 
actions were not).  
Of the three approaches, the latter would be most beneficial to the tobacco 
companies.  Each asset would be assessed independent of other elements of 
“investment”; though the outcome for each variant (that is, brand) would ultimately 
be the same, there is the benefit of divorcing the assessment from other possible 
business ventures (like income from the licencing of a variant). As Mitchell argues, 
under this conception “infringement tantamount to expropriation would be sufficient 
to make out the claim even if other elements of the business remained intact.
97
 
Though the full details of Philip Morris’ investments, diversity and losses are not yet 
clear, it seems likely based on this preliminary assessment that the plain packaging 
measures amount to expropriation. The question then becomes whether the state 
possesses the “right” to regulate (and whether this right operates to permit the 
expropriation without payment of compensation), and what the effect of the public 
health nature of the regulation is. 
                                                
95
  British American Tobacco "British American Tobacco - Recent past: 1969 – now" 2012)  
<www.bat.com> 
96
  Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co, SA v Arab Republic of Egypt (Award) ICSID 
Case No ARB/99/6, 12 April 2002 at [107] et seq. 
97
  Mitchell and Wurzberger, above n 90, at 12. 
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C Public Health & the “Right to Regulate” 
Though international law does not expressly grant states a “right to regulate”, there 
can be no doubt that states have the power to enact within their borders whatever 
regulations they deem suitable.  This is a crucial element of territorial sovereignty.
98
   
That does not mean to say that states have a plenary power to regulate without 
consequence. The tribunal in ADC Affiliate Ltd v The Republic Of Hungary 
considered that a BIT could have the effect of circumscribing a states regulatory 
power (or at least submits them to certain consequences should they elect to use it):
99
 
[while] a sovereign State possesses the inherent right to regulate its 
domestic affairs, the exercise of such a right is not unlimited and must 
have its boundaries…[W]hen a State enters into a bilateral investment 
treaty…it becomes bound by it and the investment-protection 
obligations it undertook therein must be honoured rather than be 
ignored by a later argument of the State’s right to regulate. 
This creates a tension between the rights of investors and the rights of a state to 
regulate; in many cases the resolution will be clear – the regulation will be 
expropriatory. However, where measures are taken in the public interest, such as for 
reasons of public health, the situation is arguably less clear. 
The investment and regulatory environment is dynamic. The rights of investors and 
the rights of the state (or the exercise of the plenary powers of the state) will 
oftentimes conflict. Whether the “right to regulate” operates to prevent compensation 
being payable is really a broader question about the allocation of risk in the foreign 
investment sphere. For BITs to encourage investment in the manner that they are 
intended to, investors should not be forced to ensure regulation that undermined the 
value of their investment without compensation. Nor should they be forced to 
internalise what are very clearly public risks (and which should be socialised).
100
 The 
flipside is that communities ought not be required to pay for ordinary commercial 
                                                
98
  Rudolph Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford 
Univeristy Press, Auckland, 2008) at 89. 
99
  ADC Affiliate Ltd, ADC & ADMC Management Ltd v The Republic of Hungary (Award) 
ICSID Case No ARB/03/16, 2 October 2006, at [423]. 
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risks that materialise to the detriment of the investor, and nor should their welfare 
suffer to the benefit of an investor. 101 There will always need to be some balance 
struck between these two sets of competing interests. 
To this end, there is some acceptance of circumstances in which states are not liable 
to pay compensation. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relation of the United States 
provides that states will not commit an expropriation (and therefore there is no need 
to compensate) where it adopts regulation that “[is] commonly accepted as within the 
police powers of a state”.
102
 Unfortunately, there is no bright line as to what is within 
the police powers of a state and what is not. Similarly, recent cases suggest that states 
will not be liable where they adopt, in a non-discriminatory manner, bona fide 
regulations for the purpose of enhancing general welfare.103 
Further complicating the problem is that more often than not, investment treaties do 
not explicitly list the conditions under which a host state can restrict inventor’s rights 
(despite a clear opportunity to do so).
104
 However, this is changing. Recently-
negotiated BITs do make provision for this, in large part as a result of the North 
American experience with Chapter 11 of the NAFTA and the modifications made to 
the US model BIT as a result.
105
 
Perhaps the greatest indication that the right to regulate does not excuse the payment 
of compensation is the test itself, though even this has met with mixed reception. The 
assessment mechanism under the Restatement Third appears to put the cart before the 
horse: logically the tribunal must first assess whether a measure is expropriatory, and 
                                                
101
  at  93, at [212]. 
102
  American Law Institute Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (3d ed,  St 
Paul, Minnesota, 1987), at §171. 
103  Saluka Investment VB (The Netherlands) v The Czech Republic (Partial Award) PCA, 17 
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 conference; see S 
Friedman Expropriation in International Law (Stevens & Sons Limited, London, 1953), at 2. 
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Stephan W Schill (ed) International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (Oxford 
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then decide on its legality.
106
 As earlier discussed, most BITs provide that 
expropriation will be legal where it is non-discriminatory, enacted for the public 
benefit, in accordance with due process and against compensation. It seems unusual, 
then, to suggest that takings which are for public benefit and non-discriminatory (and 
are therefore an exercise of a police power and the right to regulate) somehow 
automatically fall outside the scope of expropriation.  
The Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of Hong 
Kong for the Promotion and Protection of Investments provides in Article 6(1):
107
 
Investors of either Contracting Party shall not be deprived of their 
investments nor subjected to measures having effect equivalent to such 
deprivation in the area of the other Contracting Party except under due 
process of law, for a public purpose related to the internal needs of 
that Party, on a non-discriminatory basis, and against compensation… 
This provision, like most others, sets up a category of things that are expropriatory, 
and then carve out of this a limited category of things that are, notwithstanding their 
expropriatory nature, legal. One requirement of legality is public interest or benefit. 
Whether regulation for public benefit could be expropriatory has been considered on 
a number of occasions.  
Methanex Corporation v United States of America, concerned a ban placed on the use 
or sale in the state of California of a gasoline additive, MTBE. Methanex, a Canadian 
company, submitted a claim to arbitration under the UNCITRAL rules alleging injury 
resulting from the ban. 
In considering whether the public-interest nature of the prohibition had any impact on 
its expropriatory nature, the tribunal held that:
108
  
                                                
106
  Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company v Mexico (Award) ARB(AF)/02/1, 17 July 2007 at 
[174]. 
107
  Hong Kong-Australia BIT, above n 58. 
108
  Methanex Corporation v United States of America (Final Award on Jurisdiction and Merits) 
UNCITRAL, 3 August 2005 [Methanex], at Part IV, Chapter D, [7]. 
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as a matter of general international, a non-discriminatory regulation for 
a public purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due process and, 
which affects, inter alios, a foreign investor or investment is not 
deemed expropriatory and compensable unless specific commitments 
had been given by the regulating government to the then putative 
foreign investor contemplating investment that the government would 
refrain from such regulation. 
Appling this to the instant situation, unless Australia gave specific assurances that 
plain packaging would not be implemented at the time the investment was made there 
could be no compensable expropriation when plain packaging was implemented. No 
such assurance was made, but Philip Morris has attempted to argue around this point 
by suggesting that Australia did make assurance that it would act in accordance with 
its international trade and investment obligation (and that implicit in this was an 
assurance that there would be no measures taken subsequently that would reduce the 
value of the investment).
109
 
Though the case generally is not directly on point, the discussion of expropriation in 
SD Myers v Canada is useful. SD Myers saw an American investor complain about a 
Canadian temporary ban on the export of poly-chlorinated biphenol waste. Canada 
argued that there were health and environmental reasons for the policy, though the 
tribunal disagreed ultimately finding that the regulations were intended to protect the 
Canadian PCB disposal industry from that of the United States. 
What makes the case notable in this context is the tribunal’s approach in relation to 
expropriation (which they ultimately found did not exist, principally because of the 
temporary nature of the measures). The tribunal considered that “international law 
makes it appropriate for tribunals to examine the purpose and effect of governmental 
measures” and that the “general body of precedent usually does not treat regulatory 
action as amounting to expropriation”.
110
 
Similarly, in LG&E, the tribunal held that:
111
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[it] can generally be said that the State has the right to adopt measure 
having a social or general welfare purpose. In such a case, the measure 
must be accepted without any imposition of liability, except in cases 
where the State’s action is obviously disproportionate to the need being 
addressed. 
This reasoning mandates that a balancing exercise take place. As assessment of the 
claimed benefits of plain packaging is well outside the scope of this paper, though it 
should be noted at this point that this balance exercise would essentially weight those 
public health benefits (in the form of a reduction of smoking prevalence or an 
increase in the effectiveness of the heath warnings) against the restrictiveness of the 
measure. This is likely to involve a counterfactual positing alternative and proven 
means of reducing smoking that are available to Australia. 
Inherent in the reasoning of Methanex, SD Myers and LG&E is a contradiction. The 
tribunal in Azurix explained that according to the SD Myers reasoning: 
[a] BIT would require that investments not be expropriated except for a 
public purpose and that there be compensation if such expropriation 
takes place and, at the same time, regulatory measures that may be 
tantamount to expropriation would not give rise to a claim for 
compensation if taken for a public purpose.
112
 
Most BITs contain provisions that render expropriation lawful only if there is a 
public interest, but applying the reasoning of these three cases, the public purpose 
would mean that there was no expropriation to begin with. The use of public purpose 
to deny the very existence of expropriation when it is built in to a provision which 
rending expropriation lawful is difficult to reconcile. 
However, taking this reasoning as given for the moment the effect would be that plan 
packaging measures implemented for reasons of genuine public health (and it is hard 
to argue that they are not) are non-compensable for want of expropriation. This is the 
case no matter the substance of the resulting deprivation. 
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A more persuasive (and logically consistent) line of reasoning can be found in 
Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena v The Republic of Costa Rica. The case 
concerned the taking of 15,000 ha of property (Santa Elena) that Compania del 
Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. had purchased with the intention of developing into a 
residential community and tourist resort. The Government of Costa Rica issued a 
decree that the land was to be taken for conversion into a national park. There was no 
question that the taking was expropriation (and the Government had admitted as 
much), the question was whether the expropriation was compensable given the 
underlying public purpose. The tribunal considered that:
113
 
[while] an expropriation or taking for environmental reasons may be 
classified as a taking for a public purpose, and thus may be legitimate, 
the fact that the property was taken for this reason does not affect either 
the nature or the measure of the compensation to be paid for the taking. 
That is, the purpose of protecting the environment for which the 
property was taken does not alter the legal character of the taking for 
which adequate compensation must be paid. 
This reasoning is consistent with an ordinary reading of a BIT containing a provision 
rendering expropriation for public purpose lawful. 
Perhaps the greatest support for this latter interpretation is the practice of States in 
their approach to more recent BIT negotiations. Australia itself has attempted to close 
off the issue, and a recently concluded BIT with Chile provides that:
114
 
[e]xcept in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory action by 
a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate pubic 
welfare objectives such as public health, safety and the environment, 
do not constitute indirect expropriations. 
Identical provision was made in the 2004 US Model BIT,
115
 though this has been 
removed in the 2012 revision.
116
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  Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena SA v The Republic of Costa Rica (Final Award) 
ICSID Case No ARB/96/1, 17 February 2000, at [71] – [72] [emphasis added, footnote 
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114
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D Conclusion 
If both the investor and investment test are satisfied, then the inquiry turns to whether 
expropriation has actually occurred.  
Unlike a tax, which is designed both to reduce consumption and compensate for 
future harm (and arguably only the latter given the inelasticity of demand for tobacco 
products), the sole purpose of plain packaging is to make packets less attractive in an 
effort to curb smoking uptake and re-uptake.
117
 There is a clear deprivation of the 
investment into branding, and the effect of outright prohibition of the use of that 
branding is to prevent that investor from extracting the expected quasirents from the 
property.
118
 
The resultant effect of the plain packaging measures is the permanent deprivation of 
the ability to use, or generate value from a trademark. Even where the trademarks 
(and their use in the sale or distribution of cigarettes) concerned comprise only a 
portion of a wider investment, the significance of their value when considered as a 
portion a wider suite of investments is likely to mean that the investments are 
expropriated, notwithstanding that the investment in its entirety is not destroyed. 
Though impetus for the measures is public health, the wording of the relevant 
provision in the BIT precludes the use of public health to fundamentally alter the 
nature of the measures from expropriatory to non-expropriatory. 
Taking a step backward, it would appear that the specific driver of the plain 
packaging regime is a multilateral agreement on tobacco control. The next section 
will examine the obligations under this agreement, and under the relevant BIT. 
V External Regime (In)coherence 
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One key driver of the tobacco packaging regulations, both in Australia and overseas, 
and something that will invariably be used by other states in an effort to justify any 
regulations that they may enact is the World Health Organisation Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control (Framework Convention).
 119
 
The convention, though not binding in its entirety, may operate to require 
governments to take positive steps in an effort to reduce tobacco-related harm. This 
obligation, however, does not automatically strip investors of their intellectual 
property rights, nor relieve governments of the obligations that they owe under other 
treaties they have entered into. 
This Part explores the interface between plain packaging measures and obligations 
incumbent on State parties (generally) under the Framework Convention, and under 
the Bilateral Investment Treaty network. 
To this end it will proceed in three sections. Section A outlines the Framework 
Convention, and will discuss the nature of the obligations created under it. Section B 
will assess this apparent conflict. Section C will examine tools that have developed to 
reconcile the conflict and seek to apply them in the instant case. 
A The Framework Convention 
1 Background to the Convention 
The objective of the convention as set out in its text is:
120
 
[To] protect present and future generations from the devastating health 
social, environmental and economic consequences of tobacco 
consumption and exposure to tobacco smoke by providing a framework 
for tobacco control measures to be implemented by Parties at the 
national regional and international levels in order to reduce continually 
and substantially the prevalence of tobacco use and exposure to 
tobacco smoke. 
                                                
119
  World Health Organisation Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 2032 UNTS 166 
(adopted 21 May 2003, entered into force 27 February 2005) [Framework Convention] 
120
  at Article 3. 
CAMPBELL M M HERBERT 
 
35
The Framework Convention was developed in response to the globalisation of the 
tobacco epidemic.
121
 It recognises the complex set of interrelated factors that have 
contributed not only to the export of tobacco products, but also the export of the 
associated harm: trade liberalisation; foreign direct investment; global marketing and 
tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship; and the international movement of 
counterfeit cigarettes.
122
 
Ordinarily, a framework convention operates by creating a broad base of non-binding 
goals and a framework for negotiations. This framework and these goals are then 
supplemented by binding protocols.
123
 What makes the Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control different (and quite unique) is that it consists of some binding and 
some non-binding provisions, each with varying degrees of specificity. The latter 
provisions are intended to encourage (rather than compel) Parties to take measures to 
curb tobacco related harm.
124
 
The Convention was the first (and currently only) treaty to have been negotiated 
under the auspices of the WHO’s legislative power.
125
 It entered into force in early 
2005, having opened for signature in June 2003 and having achieved the necessary 
number of signatures within 12 months. Current membership stands at 177. 126 
Members include Australia, China (including Hong Kong), Cuba, Honduras, New 
Zealand, Switzerland, the United States, and Ukraine.
127
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Though extremely diverse in its operation, the Convention is most relevant for this 
paper to the extent that it establishes a number of mechanisms for tobacco control. 
These measures are by no means the high-water mark; and parties are encouraged to 
(and guidelines provide mechanisms to) go beyond the requirements of the 
Convention.
128
  
2 Operation 
The tobacco control measures provided for by the Convention operate on both the 
demand-side and the supply-side. This represents a “paradigm shift in developing 
regulatory strategy to address addictive substances”
129
 and stands in stark contrast to 
most other drug-control treaties, which are significantly weighted toward supply-side 
measures.
130
  
The Foreword to the Framework Convention identifies a number of key demand 
reduction mechanisms that are then translated into specific provisions in the body of 
the Convention. Broadly these fall into two categories: price, and non-price.  
Article 6 provides non-binding encouragement to parties. It provides that “[w]ithout 
prejudice to the sovereign right of the Parties to determine and establish their taxation 
policies, each Party should adopt” taxation, price and customs measure in an effort to 
reduce consumption.
131
 Parties are, however, obliged to provide information 
regarding rates of taxation and trends in consumption to the Conference of the Parties 
in their periodic reports.
132
 
Non-price measures are far broader: Article 7 contains a self-executing, binding 
obligation:
133
 
Each party shall adopt and implement effective legislative, executive, 
administrative or other measures necessary to implement its 
obligations…and shall cooperate, as appropriate, with each other 
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directly or through competent intentional bodies with a view to their 
implementation. 
Some scholars have argued that Article 7, in addition to imposing an obligation to 
implement measures to reduce demand, also imposes an obligation to defend such 
measures.
134
  
The specific obligations in the contemplation of Article 7 are found in Articles 8 
through 13. These variously provide that Parties shall adopt measures to protect its 
citizenry from exposure to tobacco smoke in workplaces, public places and public 
transport;
135
 effective measures for the measuring and testing of the contents of 
tobacco products in accordance with guidelines established by the Conference of the 
Parties;
136
 require tobacco manufacturers and importers to disclose to governmental 
authorities information about the contents and emissions of tobacco products, and 
disclose to the public information about the toxic constituents of tobacco products;
137
 
and measures to promote and strengthen public awareness of tobacco related 
issues.
138
 
Most relevant for the purposes of the instant paper are those obligations described in 
Articles 11 and 13. Article 11 concerns packaging and labelling of tobacco products, 
and provides that parties shall adopt measures to ensure that: 
(a) tobacco labelling does not promote tobacco by means that are false, 
misleading or deceptive, or create an erroneous impression about its 
characteristics, heath effects, or hazards in particular through the use of 
descriptors or trademarks that suggest a particular product is relatively 
less harmful than others;
139
 and 
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(b) each packet carries heath warnings describing the harmful effects of 
tobacco use. Such warnings shall cover more than 30 per cent of the 
principal display areas, and will ideally cover more than 50 per cent. 
This has been supplemented by Guidelines for the Implementation of Article 11. The 
guidelines recommend that, in addition to implementing measures regarding size, 
colouring, placement, language, attribution and content of health warnings,
140
 Parties 
consider
141
 
adopting measures to restrict or prohibit the use of logos, colours brand 
images or promotional information on packaging other than brand 
names and product names displayed in a standard colour and font style. 
The rationale behind this measure is that one way of minimising demand is to make 
tobacco products less attractive, plain packaging (in addition to removing aesthetic 
appeal) enhances the noticeability and effectiveness of the health warnings,
142
 and 
prevents misleading consumers through design and branding techniques.
143
 
Australia has essentially given full effect to these guidelines through its plain 
packaging legislation. 
Relevant to the extent that it restricts the use of trademarks and other brand indicia is 
Article 13. Through this article, the Convention imposes restrictions on the marketing 
of tobacco, compelling Parties to undertake a comprehensive ban of all tobacco 
advertising, promotion and sponsorship, or, where it is unable to do so as a result of 
its constitutional principles, apply restrictions on the same. 
                                                                                                                                      
cigarettes in New Zealand, changed the name ‘Marlboro Lights’ to ‘Marlboro Gold’, for 
example. This is also addressed in the Guidelines at [43]. 
140
  Guidelines for Implementation of Article 12 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control FCTC/COP3(10) (2008) [Article 12 Guidelines] at [8]-[42]. 
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Many countries have taken steps to ban advertising, promotion and sponsorship 
outright. In the case of Australia and New Zealand, these measures were taken well 
before the Framework Convention was contemplated. 
Having outlined the framework and the mechanism by which the convention 
operates, this Section will now drill down into the packaging elements of the 
convention, and look specifically at the plain packaging suggested in the Guidelines.  
3 Obligation 
Some provisions are framed in non-obligatory or nebulous terms. Article 6 begins 
“without prejudice to the sovereign rights of the Parties…”. Others, however, are 
framed in much more hard-line language. Article 11 is one such provision. Before 
describing the particular measures that must be taken,
144
 Article 11 provides that 
“[e]ach Party shall, within a period of three years after entry into force of this 
Convention for that Party adopt…”
145
 A similar approach is taken in the Guidelines.  
Though by their nature the Guidelines are drafted in less firm terms, there is still 
variation within them. While some provide that “Parties should require…”, others are 
less firm and merely provide that “Parties should consider…”. Plain packaging (as 
described in paragraph 46 of the Guidelines) falls into the latter category and so is 
arguably ‘less mandatory’ than other measures, many of the other Guidelines which 
contribute to plain packaging (such as those regarding labelling) are framed in terms 
more aligned with the former category. 
In any event, the Guidelines are not per se binding on the parties in the way that the 
Framework Convention proper is. However, by adopting the Guidelines the Parties 
have agreed to the principles and definitions they embody. When coupled with the 
obligation to interpret and implement the Framework Convention in good faith,
146
 the 
Guidelines are essentially elevated to a practical description of the steps necessary to 
                                                
144  Which are described above. 
145
  Framework Convention, above n 119, Article 11, [emphasis added]. 
146
  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1144 UNTS 331 (adopted 23 May 1969, entered 
into force 27 January 1980) [VCLT], Article 26. 
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meet the obligations imposed by the Convention.
147
 This is true notwithstanding the 
various phrasing of the Guidelines on an individual level. 
In practice plain packaging consist of two elements: a negative element, which 
obliges manufacturers and imported to refrain from using trademarks or designs in 
the packaging of their products; and a positive element which ensures the use of 
consistent and uniform designs across all manufacturers, importers and variants, and 
the inclusion of warnings or graphic imagery and health warnings. 
For the purposes of assessing the compliance with BIT obligations, we are mainly 
concerned with the first negative element. As discussed in Part IV, the obligation to 
refrain from employing a trademark – both on packaging and in advertising – renders 
the trademark and associate goodwill effectively valueless. While, legally speaking, 
the right to enforce that trademark remains (that is to say the trademark owner can 
prevent other people using it), the circumstances in which it can be used cease to 
exist. The right, therefore, has no practical value absent some positive right to use 
rather than simply enforce the trademark. It is in this circumstance where the positive 
element becomes relevant. 
What arise in the case of plain packaging are two sets of conflicting obligations 
incumbent upon a state, and a resultant fragmentation of international law. The next 
section in this part will examine is conflict in greater detail. 
B Conflict & Fragmentation 
Generally speaking, treaties operate as closed systems. Each is self-sufficient; each 
operates according to its own internal rules and resolves disputes using its own 
internal mechanisms.
148
 For the most part this operation exists entirely independently 
of other treaties.
149
 However, there are exceptions: the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties acts as a meta-treaty of sorts, providing mechanism of the 
                                                
147
  Global Smoke-free Partnership “Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: Article 8 
Toolkit” World Heart Federation <www.world-heart-federation.org>. 
148
  There are some obvious exceptions, the WTO for example. Though comprised of a number of 
different treaties, it is perhaps better conceived of as a network of treaties that, together, form 
a single closed and coherent system. 
149
  Treaties can, of course, be used to interpret each other and so the systems are not truly 
“closed”. 
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interpretation of other treaties and other customary rules. Treaties do not, however, 
operate in a normative vacuum: there is a certain basic level of interlinkage through 
operation,
150
 and also at the level of interpretation.
151
 
If the Framework Convention includes some binding obligations which compel states 
to take certain action, as this paper has argued that it does, and the result of that is the 
expropriation of private property contrary to guarantees made under a BIT then there 
is a clear conflict of obligations.  States are left in a difficult position: one the one had 
a state must take measures to reduce tobacco consumption; on the other, they must 
avoid action that reduces the commercial value of tobacco companies’ investments. 
The difficulty is that action states take in pursuit of the public health, particularly the 
reduction of tobacco consumption will necessarily have an adverse impact on an 
investor’s investment insofar as the value of the brand they are seeking to sell is 
reduced and it becomes increasingly less attractive. 
The result of this is the fragmentation of international law, and the consequences in 
this context are serious. The ultimate purpose of a BIT is to encourage foreign trade 
and investment. However, where states take action contrary to the guarantees they 
have provided under the BITs to which they are a party, the value of those treaties is 
reduced, and the network as a whole undermined. Secondly, where the Framework 
Convention (or similar public-interest treaties) are met with substantial resistance and 
states, as a result, must defend them, then states may be discouraged from entering 
into treaties of this nature in the future. In either case, the populace suffers. Perhaps 
more damaging, though, is the harm done to the overall perspective of the law.
152
 
Kelsey argues that there is an implicit acknowledgement of this tension in the 
Framework Convention, and an attempt made at resolution. Article 2(2) provides:
153
 
                                                
150
  Niklas Luhmann "Operational Closure and Structural Coupling: The Differentiation of the 
Legal System" [1992] 13 Cardozo Law Review 1419, at 1427. 
151
  Martti Koskenniemi Study on the Function and Scope of the lex specialis Rule and the 
Question of "Self-Contained" Regimes (2004), at 7; Bruno Simma and Dirk Bulkowski "Of 
Planets and the Universe: Self-contained Regimes in International Law" (2006) 17(3) The 
European Journal of International Law 483, at 492. 
152
  Report of the Study Group of the ILC, 58
th
 Session (2006) A/CB.4/L.682, at [4]. 
153
  Framework Convention, above n 119, at Article 2.2 
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The provisions of the Convention and its protocols shall in no way 
affect the right of Parties to enter into bilateral or multilateral 
agreements, including regional or sub-regional agreements, on issues 
relevant or additional to the Convention and its protocols, provided that 
such agreements are comparable with their obligations under the 
Convention and its protocols. 
The wording of the provision was a compromise between two irreconcilable 
positions.
154
 Several states were of the view that the Framework Convention should 
(expressly) take priority, and suggesting the wording:
155
 
Priority should be given to measures taken to protect public heath when 
tobacco control measures contained in this Convention and its 
protocols are examined for compatibility with other international 
agreements. 
While others were of the view that investment and trade treaties should take 
priority:
156
 
Trade policy measures for tobacco control purposes should not 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or 
disguised restriction on international trade. 
And later formulated as:
157
 
                                                
154
  Jane Kelsey International Trade Law and Tobacco Control (Tobacco Control Research 
Tūranga, 2012), at 17. 
155
  Intergovernmental Negotiating Body of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control, Fourth Session, Provisional agenda item 4, “WHO Framework convention on 
Tobacco Control’ Co-Chairs’ working papers: Final Revisions: Working Group 2,” Guiding 
Principle D.5, January 24, 2002, A/FCTC/INB4/2(a). 
156
  Intergovernmental Negotiation Body off the WHO framework convention on Tobacco 
Control, First Session, Provisional agenda Item 8, “Proposed draft Elements for a WHO 
convention on tobacco control: provisional texts with comments of the working group,” 
Guiding principle 4, July 26 2000, A/FCTC/INB1/2. 
157  Intergovernmental Negotiating Body of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control, Fourth Session, Provisional agenda Item 4, “WHO Framework convention on 
Tobacco Control’ Co-Chairs’ working papers: Final Revisions: Working Group 2,” Guiding 
Principle D.5, January 24, 2002, A/FCTC/INB4/2(a). 
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Tobacco control measures should not constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination in international trade. 
Contrary to Kelsey’s view, a plain reading of this provision would seem to suggest its 
application is limited to circumstances where Parties intend to enter into regional 
agreements that are at least broadly similar in scope to the Framework Convention:
158
 
the right of Parties to enter into bilateral or multilateral agreements, … 
on issues relevant or additional to the Convention and its protocols… 
Regional agreements on trade in illicit tobacco products, or a multi-state agreement 
relating to the cross-border advertising of tobacco would fall within the ambit of this 
provision. Investment treaties, however, would not (unless specific provision was 
made for tobacco products). 
In this respect the provision does little to resolve tensions arising between the 
Framework Convention and agreements that are largely dissimilar (such as 
investment treaties). Absent one treaty subordinating itself to another, the default 
position at international law, and a fundamental principle that has been codified in the 
Vienna Convention, is that of pacta sunt servanda. Article 26 of the Vienna 
Convention provides that:
159
 
[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith. 
States must therefore wrangle with the impossible task of discharging their 
obligations under both the Framework Convention and the BIT. Some conflict 
resolution must still take place, however, and the nature of the instant conflict is zero-
sum. To resolve this, we must look outside of the two conflicting treaties to 
international law more generally. 
C Resolving the Conflict / Defragmentation 
There are no clear rules for dealing with conflict in the international law space. Rules 
do, however, exist in both domestic law and private international law and these may 
                                                
158
  Framework Convention, above n 119, Article 2.2 (emphasis added). 
159
  VCLT, Article 26. 
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have some valuable application to international law disputes of the instant kind. This 
section will examine those rules presented in domestic and private international law 
systems, and then assess their applicability in the international law space and to this 
conflict. 
1 Domestic law solutions 
Domestic law routinely encounters internal conflicts that require resolution. To this 
end, rules to deal with pluralism have developed: in domestic law these can be 
broken down into two general groupings. The first set examines the relative 
hierarchal status of the conflicting laws, while the second assesses their temporality 
and their specificity 
Which is applied in a given setting is ultimately a product of the specific conflict 
situation, but as between the two sets of rules, those based on hierarchy will take 
priority for reasons that will become apparent as we examine the rules’ content. 
The conflict of norms rules work first by assessing the relative hierarchical status of 
the conflicting rules.
160
 Under the rule lex superior derogate legi inferiori the 
hierarchically superior rule will take priority over the hierarchically inferior rule.
161
 
In practice, the application of this rule within a domestic legal system is usually very 
clear: rules with constitutional status take priority over statutes, which in turn take 
priority over the common law; legislation over regulations; mandatory rules over 
party autonomy. 
Difficulty arises, of course, where there is no hierarchy. Where this is the case, the 
second set of rules will come into play. 
This second set of rules seeks to examine the legal fiction of the relevant lawmaker’s 
intent. The doctrine lex posterior derogate legi priori dictates that more recently 
made law will take priority over older law (to the extent that both laws concern the 
                                                
160
  Ralf Michaels and Joost Pauwelyn "Conflict of Norms or Conflict of Laws?: Different 
Techniques in the Fragmentation of Public International Law" (2012) 22(3) Duke Journal of 
Comparative and International Law 349, at 354. 
161
  Aulis Aarnio The Rational as Reasonable: A Treatise on Legal Justification (Kluwer, 
Dordrecht, Holland, 1987) at 98. 
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same subject matter).
162
 The doctrine lex specialis derogate legi generali provides 
that more specific law will override more general law. Both of these rules presume an 
intention on the part of the lawmaker that specific and recent should be applied in 
favour older of more general law; though not immediately obvious this also involves 
the application of a legal fiction wherein all law-making acts are imputed to a single 
lawmaker with a coherent regulatory intent. While this legal fiction may not strictly 
mirror reality (in situations where regulators are frequently changing, regulation is 
ordinarily delegated, or, as in the common law, where multiple groups perform a law-
making function this will rarely be the case), it is unlikely to present any significant 
problems in the domestic law setting. 
By the very nature of their origin, domestic law conflicts rules exist to resolve 
conflicts within a single system. But what happens when a conflict exists between 
systems? Private international law (or “conflict of laws” in North American parlance) 
exists to resolve conflicts between systems. Though “international” would suggest it 
has application only in the international law sphere, the rules are suited to the 
resolution of most inter-state
163
 conflicts. 
2 Private International Law Solutions 
There are a multitude of private international law solutions, and states have put their 
own spin on even the generally accepted approaches. However, like domestic law, the 
rules can be broadly grouped into three sets: the traditional approach, the state 
interest approach, and the functional approach.
164
 
(a) The traditional approach 
The traditional approach is the principal approach employed in both Europe and the 
United States. It seeks to determine the law applicable to a factual situation in an 
abstract sense (that is, without regard to the substantive law), through the application 
of so called “choice-of-law” rules that are specific to the subject of the dispute.
165
 
                                                
162
  at 98. 
163  ‘state’ is used here both in the sense of a Nation State, but also in a federal sense. 
164
  Michaels and Pauwelyn, above n 160, at 357. 
165
  A F M Manituzzaman "International Commercial Arbitration: The Conflict of Laws Issues in 
Determining the Applicable Substantive Law in the Context of Investment Agreements" 
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First, the ‘problem’ is characterised (as one of tort, contract, and so on).
166
 Different 
areas of law have different ‘choice of law’ rules; the aim at this stage is to determine 
the area of law in which the problem arises such that the correct choice of law rule 
can be identified.
167
 
Second, the choice of law rule of the identified applicable area of law is applied. 
Generally this involves assessing the dispute for a number of connecting factors 
(territory, nationality, domicility) that point toward the particular law that will 
ultimately be applied.
168
 
Finally unless there is some overriding public policy ground that would prevent the 
application of the law in the forum state, the determined law is applied.
169
  
(b) The state interest approach 
Professor Brainerd Currie developed the state or governmental interest approach as a 
response to the traditional approach.
170
 It directs the forum to assess the interest of 
each government in having its own law applied; and unlike the traditional approach 
there is a focus on the substance of the law.  In view of the text of the law and the 
legislative intent, the first step is to determine which rule claims applicability in the 
situation presented, which will more often than not result in multiple states’ law 
claiming applicability (or, more accurately, multiple states claiming the applicability 
of their law).  
                                                                                                                                      
(1993)  Netherlands International Law Review, XL 201, at 205; see generally Lord Collins 
and others (eds) Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws (15th ed,  Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 2012), at [1-001] et seq, [2-002] et seq, at [5-001] et seq. 
166
  Note however, that there is substantial debate as to whether characterization is a preliminary 
or an incidental question. See generally Lord Collins and others, above n 165, at [2-002] et 
seq. 
167
  Michaels and Pauwelyn, above n 160, at 358. 
168
  Lord Collins and others, above n 165, at [1-078] - [1-088]. 
169
  at [5-001] et seq. 
170
  See Brainerd Currie "The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and 
the Judicial Function" (1958) 26 Univeristy of Chicago Law Review 9; Brainerd Currie 
"Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws" (1958)  Duke Law Journal 171 
and Brainerd Currie "Surival of Actions: Adjudication versus Automation in the Conflict of 
Laws" (1958) 10 Stanford Law Review 205. 
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This “true” conflict can be resolved in one of a number of ways, though the most 
common is an assessment of ‘relative’ or ‘comparative’ impairment’.
171
 The result of 
this assessment is to require the decision maker to apply the law that would suffer the 
greater impairment as a result of non-application.
172
 Importantly, this inquiry 
involves the balancing of governmental interests rather than balancing government 
policy.
173
 
(c) The functional approach 
The functional approach, like the traditional approach is subject to different treatment 
in different states. However framed, the ultimate goal is the same: the identification 
of the law that is most appropriate, in that it has the closest connection to the factual 
matrix presented by the dispute.
174
 It is difficult to comprehensively summarise the 
mechanics of the functional approach (because of the diversity illustrated in the 
various state- and issue-specific manifestations).  By way of illustration, however, the 
approach in the United States is to look to factors such as the relevant strength of the 
policies, the control that the states whose law is potentially applicable can exercise 
over the matter, and the commonness between states of particular elements of 
policy.
175
  
Having set out a number of possible approaches The question now becomes: how 
suitable are these approaches for application, both in the international law sphere on a 
general level, and also to the conflict that arises between BITs and the Framework 
Convention. 
                                                
171
  Jessica Freiheit "Choice of Law Issues: Selecting the Appropriate Law" in Proskauer Rose 
LLP (ed) Proskauer on International Litigation and Arbitration: Managing, Resolving and 
Avoiding Cross-Border Business or Regulatory Disputes (2011), at [IV.D.5]. 
172  at [IV.D.2]. 
173
  Michaels and Pauwelyn, above n 160, at 360, citing Tucci v Club Mediterranee, SA, 89 Cal 
App 4
th
 180 (2001). 
174
  The approach developed in the area of contract law, for a specific discussion see Russell 
Weintraub "Functional Developments in Choice of Law for Contracts" in  Volume 187 of 
Académie de doit international, recueil des cours, 1984-IV (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 1985) 
at 249 – 260. For a more general discussion, see F A Mann "The Proper Law in the Conflict 
of Laws" (1987) 46 International Law & Comparative Law Quarterly 437, at 437 – 438. 
175
  Michaels and Pauwelyn, above n 160, at 360. 
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3 Application in International Law Conflicts 
The effectiveness of the rules when applied to international law conflicts ultimately 
hinges on how we conceive of international law.  If it is a single system, then 
domestic law rules will be the most appropriate solution.  If it is several systems, 
which, at times, interact, then the private international law solutions will be most 
appropriate.  Michaels and Pauwelyn argue that this question is moot: whether 
international law behaves like a single system or like multiple systems is a product of 
the rules that are applied.
176
  This is true to an extent, though the decision of which 
rules to apply, as a matter of principle, should be based on the appropriateness of the 
application rather than the behaviour of the object subject to that decision.  
This paper has taken the position the international law conflict between BITs and the 
Framework Convention is principally a result of the relevant treaties operating as 
separate systems.  For this reason the most appropriate conflict-resolution method is 
the application of private international law rules. For completeness, however, we will 
also examine the application of domestic law solutions. 
(a) Domestic law solutions 
Domestic law solutions are perhaps the most intuitively attractive: they are 
(relatively) straightforward, virtually uniform between common and civil law, and 
present the clearest outcomes.  However, as a result of the very presumptions that 
grant intra-systemic conflicts rules efficacy, the rules do not operate well in the 
context of inter-systemic conflict. 
In the first instance, there is no clear hierarchy between legal systems. Jus cogens are 
superior, but they are few and specific.
177
  What remains after the removal of superior 
norms is relative anarchy.  
Within international law subsystems, hierarchy can sometimes be established: Article 
XVI:3 of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation provides that it 
                                                
176  at 362. 
177
  Enzo Cannizzaro The Law of Treaties Beyond the Vienna Convention (Oxford University 
Press, Auckland, 2011) at 144; see generally Ian Brownlie Principles of International Law 
(5
th
 ed, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1998) at 517. 
CAMPBELL M M HERBERT 
 
49
is superior to and will prevail over all other WTO agreements.
 178
 Generally, 
however, the priority of systems is only that which each system claims for itself over 
others.
179
  The difficulties are even more acute when it is not the treaties themselves 
that conflict but rather it is the actions taken by states in an effort to implement those 
treaties (as in the instant case).  
The other limiting factor is the presumption of internal coherence.  As discussed 
above, domestic legal systems – albeit by legal fiction – are presumed to have 
coherent legislative intent that is imputed to a unitary lawmaker.
180
  This allows for 
the application of the doctrines of lex specialis and lex posterior.  While these 
doctrines have long been recognised at international law,
181
 and on occasion played a 
significant role in international jurisprudence,
182
 the presumption on which they rely 
is far less legitimate in an international law setting.  
In the instant case the Framework Convention post-dates the relevant bilateral 
investment treaty. It could be argued that as a more recent treaty, the Framework 
Convention will take priority. 
The Vienna Convention, however, makes clear that this is limited to situations where 
there is an overlap in the substantive content of the treaties. Article 30(3) provides 
that when starts are party to multiple treaties concerning the same subject matter 
“[t]he earlier treaty applies only to the extent that is provisions are compatible with 
those of the later treaty”.  Similarly, the “generalia rule can only apply where both the 
specific and general provision concerned deal with the same subject matter”.
183
 
It could, of course, be argued that the Framework Convention is more specific than 
the BIT (it concerns cigarettes whereas the BIT concerns trade and investment in a 
more general sense). However, to construct the subjects of the treaties this way is 
                                                
178  Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization1867UNTS(concluded 15 
April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995), Article XVI:3. 
179
  Michaels and Pauwelyn, above n 160. 
180
  Simma and Bulkowski, above n 151, at 489. 
181
  See Ambatelos Case (Greece v United Kingdom) (Merits) [1952] ICJ Rep 28, dissenting 
opinion of Judge Hsu at [87]. 
182  Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) ICJ Rep (1997), at [132]; INA 
Corporation v Iran 75 ILR 1987, at [378]. 
183
  Gerald Fitzmaurice, “The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1951-4: 
Treaty Interpretation and other Points” (1957) 33 BYIL at 203.  
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somewhat artificial.  When the “public health” lenses are removed and the situation 
viewed through international trade or international economic law lenses then the 
situation could just as legitimately be interpreted the opposite way.
184
 
Ultimately, whether there is an overlap between the BIT and the Framework 
Convention turns on how broadly one construes the “subject matter” of the treaty; in 
this particular case to suggest that there is identity of subject sufficient to invoke a 
priority rule would require an unreasonably broad interpretation.   
This is not to say that the domestic rules are of no use. There are, of course, some 
circumstances where the rules will have successful application – within treaty 
subsystems, for example,
185
 though this largely because the systems exhibit the same 
characteristics as the domestic systems the rules developed to serve.  More broadly, 
though to decline application of the rules for want of relationships exhibited in 
domestic law elements is to make the mistake of presuming that that in order for 
international law as a system to operate things must manifest in much the same 
manner as they do in a domestic law sense. 
To this end, Article 53 of the Vienna Convention refers to the “international 
community of states” as being the creator of jus cogens.  While the “billiard ball”
186
 
model of international relations law is rightly considered inadequate and dated for 
many purposes,
187
 it is still possible to legitimately construct a legal fiction in which 
the ‘unitary lawmaker’ is the community as a whole rather that some supra-national 
government.  
Even if we adjust our view to reflect this different manifestation, it does not 
overcome what is perhaps the more fundamental problem of a lack of coherent law-
making intent.  Treaty-making is largely heterogeneous (that’s not, however to say 
                                                
184
  Kelsey, above n 154, at 18. 
185
  To use the WTO as an example again, applying les specialis to a conflict between the GATT 
and the TBT would provide that the more specific rules of the latter prevail over the more 
general rules of the former, subject always to the overriding agreement establishing the WTO. 
186  The model avoids looking to the internal politics of a state to understand international 
relations, instead focusing only on the external pressures of a unitary state in assessing the 
interactions between states. 
187
  Simma and Bulkowski, above n 180, at 489. 
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that this is true of all international lawmaking).
188
 Negotiations in different subject 
matters often fall within the competence of different ministries (or even different 
regional levels, as in the case of the European Union).  As Martti Koskenniemi 
explained in his Preliminary Report for the International Law Commission:
189
 
There is no single legislative will behind international law. Treaties and 
custom come about as a result of conflicting motives and objectives – 
they are “bargains” and “package-deals” and often result from 
spontaneous reactions to events in the environment. 
It is clear, then, that these domestic law rules can work in international law (at least 
to the extent that the actors can be broadly analogised to actors in a domestic system).  
However, where the conflict exists between “two treaties concluded with no 
conscious sense that they are part of the ‘same project’” then the rules are of little 
use, and we must employ an alternative – the private international law rules.
190
  
(b) Private international law 
The private international law approaches present a somewhat brighter future, though 
they are still not without limitation. 
The traditional approach – that is, the examination of connecting factors – principal 
limit in this respect is its presumption that the systems it is examining are both 
complete (or at least essentially complete) legal orders.
191
  The Framework 
Convention and the BIT do not exhibit anything even close to completeness – both 
are highly specific and do not give any consideration to law on a level of broad 
application. 
Furthermore the application of the traditional approach requires there to be something 
extant in the system to which a connecting factor can attach. A cursory inspection of 
the connecting factors reveals that they are very clearly geared toward application to 
                                                
188
  See Jean D’Aspremont “The Doctrinal Illusion of the Heterogeneity of the International 
Lawmaking Process” in Hélène Ruiz-Fabri and others (eds) Selected Proceedings of the 
European Society of International Law: 2008 (Hart Publishing, 2010) Vol 2, 297. 
189  Martti Koskenniemi Study on the Function and Scope of the lex specialis Rule and the 
Question of "Self-Contained" Regimes (2004). 
190
  Report of the Study Group of the ILC, 58
th
 Session (2006) A/CB.4/L.682, at [255]. 
191
  Michaels and Pauwelyn, above n 160 at 361. 
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the law of a state. Territory, nationality, and domicility naturally mirror the 
traditionally accepted requirements of statehood (territory, government, and 
permanent population).
192
 
However, international law systems – and in specific the treaties at issue – do not 
possess these characteristics: the treaties arguably have no population, they have no 
territory, and though a treaty may have an entity that performs some governmental 
function (the Framework Convention has the Conference of the Parties, for example) 
it cannot truly be said to have a “government” in the ordinary sense of the word. 
The state interest approach is limited in its application for essentially the same 
reason. The approach presumes the existence of at least two governments whose 
interests are competing. To see why this is problematic, one need only look to the 
instant conflict.  
The WHO and the Conference of the Parties are both entities comprised of a number 
of governments.
193
 As can been seen from the history of the Framework Convention, 
the interest of those individual governments are at times quite diverse. The mere fact 
that those various governments have been aggregated to form a single entity does not 
automatically unify their interests (at least on the whole). There is no internal 
consistency. 
Secondly when the entities are disaggregated is clear that even within a given state 
government there is conflict: while one arm has signed a treaty pledging to act to 
reduce tobacco consumption, another has signed a treaty guaranteeing rights to 
inbound foreign investors (which may or may not include tobacco companies). There 
is no internal consistency. This presents a problem in that without internal 
consistency the outward facing interest to be balanced cannot be identified. In any 
event, the nature of the dispute is such that there is no acceptable standard for 
balancing those interests that can be identified.
194
 
The functional approach is perhaps the most useful. It addresses both the problem of 
conflict (in so far as it is capable of resolving it), but also the problem of 
                                                
192
  Brownlie, above n 177, at 83-85. 
193
  WHO and COP are comprised of governments. 
194
  Michaels and Pauwelyn, above n 160 at 357. 
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fragmentation. Within a system the goal is coherence and this is achieved though 
compromise solutions. Between systems the goal is coordination, which is achieved 
by maintaining the internal integrity of each independent system by minimising 
friction between systems by designating one over the other. 
(c) An alternative approach? 
There are two further approaches that ought to be considered (and which are specific 
to international law). Some commentators have suggested that rather than making an 
assessment of the substantive obligations, the focus should be on the enforcement 
mechanisms available under the treaties imposing the obligations.
195
  
The Framework Convention has no enforcement mechanism (it is, however, open to 
the Conference of the Parties to develop and adopt one as a protocol at some 
subsequent point). Contrastingly, the BIT between Australia and Hong Kong has an 
enforcement mechanism in the form of an investor state dispute mechanism. The 
result of this is that the absence of the mechanism in the Framework Convention 
pushes the obligations in the BIT to the fore. An ICSID tribunal established under the 
BIT’s ISDM exists to determine whether the state Party to the BIT
196
 has complied 
with its obligations. For the most part, this allows the tribunal to assess the 
obligations in a vacuum and without regard to obligations under other treaties. 
Arguably for a tribunal to consider other when assessing a claim of breach would be 
to overstep their obligations. In any event, Treaty parties are obliged to perform their 
obligations under treaties that bind them in good faith even if the result is that 
obligations are conflicting and compensation is payable.
197
 
The consequence of this approach is that there will be conflicts in cases where the 
facts mean the outcome is marginal. This is not merely an academic problem. In what 
has been described as “the ultimate fiasco in investment arbitration”
198
 Laude v The 
Czech Republic and CME Czech Republic BV v The Czech Republic saw a London 
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tribunal and a Stockholm tribunal consider the same set of facts (and apply the same 
law).
199
 The awards rendered by the tribunals were diametrically opposed in virtually 
every sense. The result of this is the much-feared fragmentation of international law. 
Recognising that this is perhaps the most workable approach, and that the problem 
will only increase as states take greater measures in the interest of public health and 
safety, some states have acted to remove the ISDM from subsequently negotiated 
investment treaties.
200
 Subject to local remedies requirements, investors must 
therefore revert to the traditional diplomatic protection avenues to recover lost 
investments.
201
 
VI Conclusion 
The conflict between Bilateral Investment Treaties and multilateral public-interest 
treaties such as the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control presents a novel 
conflict. Often states will take regulatory action that has an adverse impact on an 
investor in the name of the public interest. Less frequently, though, will this 
regulation be the result of (or compelled by) another international agreement. 
National courts present a domestic solution. Though outcome will ultimately turn on 
the domestic legislative substance and the constitutional framework in which the 
regulations are enacted. The WTO presents another, perhaps the more publically 
recognised forum, though this forum is again subject to constraint. The vast carve-out 
for measures taken in the interests of public health and the small range of remedies 
mean that the forum is of limited utility to the claiming nations (and thus also to the 
tobacco companies). 
Investment arbitration is different, however. It limits are drawn only by the relevant 
BIT, and the tribunal need only assess whether a violation of the BIT has occurred – 
not weigh it against other factors as in the constitutional case, nor change the manner 
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of application through carve-outs in the law (unless so prescribed by the BIT itself) in 
the WTO case. 
This presents a unique conflict. It is undeniable that tobacco is harmful, and to this 
end states have become party to a convention which seeks to reduce consumption and 
mitigate tobacco related harm. States, however, sought to encourage investment by 
extending to investors a minimum level of certainty with respect to the security of 
their investment. Can it be that this public interest overrides the private interest of 
investors? There can be no doubt that states possess the power to regulate in the 
public interest. States very clearly have a plenary power to legislate, but this power is 
constrained by consequence (if nothing else). Where legislation has an adverse 
consequence on an investment, then states open themselves to claims of 
expropriation.  
In the instant case Philip Morris arguably made an investment in Australia, 
establishing a number of lines of cigarettes and other tobacco products to which 
significant goodwill attaches. The plain packaging regulations reduce the value of 
this goodwill and the value of the underlying trademarks. Prima facie, the regulations 
are expropriatory. It could be that there is an “out” for states – that regulation in the 
public interest does not amount to expropriation, though an analysis of the very 
provision providing protection against expropriation would suggest that this 
reasoning is flawed. 
What arises then is a significant tension. States have offered protection to tobacco 
companies investing within their borders on the one hand, but on the other they have 
signed a convention and supported various implementing guidelines that call for 
action which will negatively affect those investors. States are effectively forced to 
choose between the implementation of two sets of obligations which cannot 
comfortably co-exist. The result is fragmentation of international law, and the 
undermining of both the Framework Convention (and related public health issues) 
and the BIT system.  
There are some tools to deal with this – conflict rules imported from domestic and 
private international law – though none are particularly well suited to application in a 
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case like the present. There are also rudimentary alternatives: looking at enforcement 
mechanisms to determine effective priority. 
Ultimately the answer appears to be that the rights and obligations cannot be 
reconciled. Unfortunate as it may be for states, cigarettes and other tobacco products 
are subject to the ordinary rules of trade and investment, and the same standards of 
review as other, less harmful, products. That states signed a convention committing 
to reduce tobacco consumption does not excuse them from obligations under other 
treaties. 
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